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575 
Recanting Confidential Witnesses in Securities 
Litigation 
Gideon Mark* 
This Article examines the contentious and recurring issue of how 
courts should handle confidential witnesses in securities litigation who 
recant the information attributed to them in complaints or deny that 
they ever provided such information to plaintiffs’ counsel and/or 
investigators.  The use by plaintiffs of confidential witnesses has become 
ubiquitous in recent years, as a primary unintended effect of the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.  That legislation raised the 
bar for pleading securities fraud and established an automatic stay of 
all discovery and other proceedings during the pendency of a motion to 
dismiss, absent application of one of two narrow exceptions.  The vise-
like combination of these features forces plaintiffs to plead their cases 
with particularity while barring them from obtaining discovery to 
bolster their scienter and other allegations until all motions to dismiss 
have been resolved.  In response, plaintiffs have turned to confidential 
witnesses, who typically are current or former employees of the 
defendant.  These witnesses provide information anonymously for use in 
complaints, mainly because they are fearful of retaliation by defendants.  
In a recent series of high-profile cases, courts have been confronted 
with allegations that plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses either have 
recanted the information attributed to them, or denied ever providing 
such information.  This Article examines the contrasting approaches 
taken by courts to alleged recanting, and provides some specific 
recommendations for avoiding or resolving this problem in the future.   
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the primary unintended effects of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”)1 has been the widespread 
use of confidential witnesses in class action securities litigation.  
Confidential witnesses (“CWs”) are typically current or former 
employees of the defendant company who anonymously provide 
information to plaintiffs for use in their class action complaints.  The 
information, provided anonymously because the employees are fearful 
of retaliation, is usually used by plaintiffs to bolster scienter allegations. 
Two specific aspects of the PSLRA have sparked the use of CWs in 
securities litigation.  The first aspect is the PSLRA’s significantly 
higher bar for pleading securities fraud.  The PSLRA amended the 
Securities Exchange Act2 to impose two strict pleading requirements, 
both of which must be satisfied in order for a complaint to survive a 
 
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). 
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a–78mm). 
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motion to dismiss.  A private securities complaint involving an 
allegedly false or misleading statement must specify each statement 
alleged to be misleading, the reason(s) why the statement is misleading, 
and, if an allegation is made on information and belief, “all facts” on 
which that belief is formed.3  In addition, the complaint must, with 
respect to each act or omission alleged to violate the securities laws, 
state with particularity facts giving rise to a “strong inference” that the 
particular defendant acted with the required state of mind.4  The 
required state of mind is “scienter,” which the Supreme Court has 
defined as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud.”5 
The second aspect is the PSLRA’s automatic stay of all discovery 
and other proceedings during the pendency of a motion to dismiss,6 
absent application of one of two statutory exceptions.7  Congress 
created the stay to prevent plaintiffs from (1) commencing securities 
litigation with the intent to use the discovery process to coerce 
settlements and (2) commencing such litigation as a vehicle to conduct 
discovery in the hope of finding a sustainable claim.8  The stay applies 
to both class actions and individual actions.9  If a motion to dismiss by 
any defendant is pending, discovery is stayed for the entire case, even if 
there are multiple defendants, some of whom have had their motions to 
dismiss denied and/or have answered.10  The stay encompasses 
 
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012). 
4. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2). 
5. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193–94 & n.12 (1976). 
6. Pre-PSLRA, defendants in federal securities cases were required to participate in discovery 
during the pendency of motions to dismiss.  Defendants could avoid discovery only by moving 
for a protective order, requesting a stay, and showing good cause under Rule 26(c) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  Such motions were typically denied.  Gideon Mark, Federal Discovery 
Stays, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 405, 434 (2012).  Post-PSLRA, discovery is automatically 
stayed.  The statute provides: “In any private action arising under this chapter, all discovery and 
other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court 
finds upon motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or 
to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
7. The two exceptions are when particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or 
to prevent undue prejudice to the party seeking relief.  Id. § 77z-1(b)(1); id. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B). 
8. In re NAHC, Inc. Sec. Litig., 306 F.3d 1314, 1332 (3d Cir. 2002); In re Thornburg Mortg., 
Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV 07-0815 JB/WDS, 2010 WL 2977620, at *6 (D.N.M. July 1, 2010). 
9. See, e.g., Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02 CV 157, 1:02 CV 370, 1:02 CV 382, 2002 
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (“[B]y its plain language the statutory stay is not 
limited to class actions.”); Med. Imaging Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Lichtenstein, 917 F. Supp. 717, 
719–21 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that the PSLRA mandates a discovery stay in any private action 
where a motion to dismiss is pending). 
10. See Lane v. Page, No. CIV 06-1071, 2009 WL 1312896, at *1 (D.N.M. Feb. 9, 2009) 
(“The result may be harsh, but Congress has clearly expressed a desire that discovery not proceed 
in any securities litigation the PSLRA covers until all pending motions to dismiss have been 
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discovery during the pendency of motions to dismiss amended 
complaints11 and motions for reconsideration of orders on motions to 
dismiss,12 and it is of great practical significance.  Original complaints 
are often amended multiple times in securities litigation, with the result 
that many months or even years can pass before discovery begins.13  
This is the typical pattern, because plaintiffs have generally failed in 
their efforts to have the PSLRA’s automatic stay lifted, under either the 
first14 or second15 statutory exceptions. 
The vise-like combination of the PSLRA’s strict pleading 
requirements and discovery stay explains the ubiquity of CWs.  
Plaintiffs must plead their cases with particularity, but they are 
generally barred from obtaining discovery to bolster their scienter and 
other allegations before all motions to dismiss have been resolved.16  
The result has been almost universal reliance by plaintiffs in class action 
securities complaints on information provided by confidential 
 
resolved.”); Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02 CV 157, 1:02 CV 370, 1:02 CV 382, 2002 
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (holding that the stay applies even as to 
discovery against co-defendants who have not filed motions to dismiss).  But see Latham v. Stein, 
Nos. 6:08-2995-RBH, 6:08-3183-RBH, 2010 WL 3294722, at *3 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2010) (lifting 
stay as to certain defendants whose motions to dismiss had been denied). 
11. Selbst v. McDonald’s Corp., No. 04 C 2422, 2006 WL 566450, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 1, 
2006). 
12. McGuire v. Dendreon Corp., No. C07-800-MJP, 2009 WL 666863, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
Mar. 11, 2009); Powers v. Eichen, 961 F. Supp. 233, 235–36 (S.D. Cal. 1997). 
13. See, e.g., In re SemGroup Energy Partners, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. 08-MD-1989-GFK-FHM, 
2010 WL 5376262, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 2010) (“Thus, this lawsuit has been pending more 
than two years, during which time plaintiffs have been almost completely precluded from 
conducting discovery.”). 
14. See, e.g., In re Merrill Lynch & Co. Research Reports Sec. Litig., Nos. 02 MDL 
1484(MP), 01 CV 6881(MP), 2004 WL 305601, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (refusing to lift 
stay because defendants avowed they had taken all necessary steps to preserve all potentially 
relevant electronic evidence). 
15. The most commonly asserted basis for a claim of undue prejudice is the existence of 
parallel litigation, or parallel criminal or regulatory investigations, which required class action 
defendants to produce documents to other plaintiffs, the government, or an investigating body.  
Courts usually reject this argument.  See, e.g., Kuriakose v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Co., 674 F. 
Supp. 2d 483, 486–87 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (refusing to lift stay where about 400,000 documents had 
been produced by lead defendant during active investigations conducted by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and a House of Representatives committee); 
see also In re Schering-Plough Corp./Enhance Sec. Litig., No. 08-397, 2009 WL 1470453, at *1 
(D.N.J. May 19, 2009) (refusing to modify stay to permit plaintiffs to obtain documents 
previously produced to government regulators and investigators). 
16. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pleading After Tellabs, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 507, 530 (noting that 
the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements and stay “put[] a plaintiff in a vise: the pleading rules 
require particularized allegations and a strong inference of scienter while the discovery stay 
deprives the attorney of the conventional means to develop this information”). 
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witnesses.17  Allegations based on such information often are the only 
specific allegations in a complaint supporting a claim of securities 
fraud.18  At the same time that plaintiffs have become reliant on the 
information provided by CWs, courts have become increasingly 
skeptical of such witnesses.19 
The common use of CWs in securities litigation has highlighted 
significant issues concerning pleading and discovery.  One recurring 
issue is the extent to which the information provided by confidential 
witnesses must be discounted in the aftermath of the 2007 decision by 
the United States Supreme Court in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & 
Rights, Ltd. (“Tellabs”).20  In Tellabs, the Court resolved a three-way 
circuit split concerning whether and to what extent courts must consider 
and weigh competing culpable and non-culpable inferences in deciding 
whether a complaint has satisfied the PSLRA’s pleading requirement 
that plaintiffs state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that defendants acted with the required state of mind.  The 
Court held that that to qualify as “strong” an inference of scienter must 
be more than merely plausible or reasonable.21  Rather, a complaint will 
survive a motion to dismiss “only if a reasonable person would deem 
the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any 
 
17. See, e.g., Douglas H. Flaum & Israel David, Disclosure of Confidential Witnesses in 
PSLRA Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 31, 2012, at 1 (“Of the various tools employed by plaintiffs’ 
counsel in securities cases, few are more important than the use of confidential witnesses in 
complaints.”); Andrew W. Stern, Dorothy J. Spenner & Cameron Moxley, Allowing Discovery of 
a Confidential Witness’s Identity, LAW360 (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.sidley.com/files/ 
Publication/038bbbf8-aa12-4c7c-a7d2-05b6341d0606/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bab0c 
52c-2000-40b0-90eb-09805607f48b/REV_Allowing%20Discovery%20Of%20A%20Confidentia 
l%20Witnesss%20Identity%20_2_.pdf (noting that CWs “are increasingly becoming the 
backbone of class action securities complaints”). 
18. See THE ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. SEC. LITIG. COMM., SUBCOMM. ON USE 
OF CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES, DIALOGUE ON THE CURRENT LAW AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
ON THE USE OF INFORMATION FROM AND THE DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INFORMANTS 3 
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071798-UseofConfidential 
Sources.pdf (“Given the restrictions of the PSLRA, informants are virtually the only means of 
obtaining non-public evidence of wrongdoing at a company and are often essential for avoiding 
early dismissal of a meritorious action.”) (The foregoing report includes separate sections written 
by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel.  The foregoing quotation is taken from the plaintiffs’ 
section.); see also Christopher Keller & Michael Stocker, Balancing the Scales: The Use of 
Confidential Witnesses in Securities Class Actions, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 87 (2009) 
(“[I]n the absence of publicly available information from SEC or Department of Justice 
investigations, allegations based on information provided by confidential witnesses offer the ‘best 
hope’ of plaintiffs surviving the PSLRA pleading standards.”). 
19. Michele Odorizzi, Impact of the PSLRA on Securities Litigation, ASPATORE, June 2013, 
available at 2013 WL 2137388, at *4. 
20. 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
21. Id. at 324. 
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opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”22 
The Supreme Court did not address the use of CWs.  Nevertheless, 
numerous federal courts have applied Tellabs to assess the use of such 
witnesses.  Many courts, following the lead of the Seventh Circuit in 
Higginbotham v. Baxter, International, Inc.,23 have concluded that the 
information supplied by confidential witnesses in securities fraud 
complaints must be steeply discounted when deciding motions to 
dismiss.24  Other courts have rejected Higginbotham and eschewed 
automatic discounting.25 
 
22. Id. 
23. 495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“It is hard to see how information from anonymous 
sources could be deemed ‘compelling’ or how we could take account of plausible opposing 
inferences.  Perhaps these confidential sources have axes to grind.  Perhaps they are lying.  
Perhaps they don’t even exist. . . . [A]llegations from ‘confidential witnesses’ must be discounted 
rather than ignored.  Usually that discount will be steep.”). 
24. See, e.g., Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. MEMC Elec. Materials, 641 F.3d 
1023, 1030 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing Higginbotham and disregarding allegations by CWs); Ley v. 
Visteon Corp., 543 F.3d 801, 811 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Higginbotham approvingly), abrogated 
on other grounds by Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1323-25 (2011); 
Indiana Elec. Workers’ Pension Fund IBEW v. Shaw Grp., Inc., 537 F.3d 527, 535 (5th Cir. 
2008) (“Following Tellabs, courts must discount allegations from confidential sources.”); 
Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Judicial Access Barriers to Remedies for 
Securities Fraud, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 58 (2012) (“[T]here is a growing trend of 
discounting allegations that are based on confidential witness statements.”); David Artman, Note, 
Who’s Behind Door Number One?: Problems with Using Confidential Sources in Securities 
Litigation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1827, 1843 (noting Higginbotham’s strong influence). 
25. See, e.g., Rahman v. Kid Brands, Inc., 736 F.3d 237, 244 (3d Cir. 2013).  Although 
influential in other jurisdictions, Higginbotham has attracted significant criticism from 
commentators.  See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Congress, the Supreme 
Court and the Proper Role of Confidential Informants in Securities Fraud Litigation, 36 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 345 (2008) (arguing that Higginbotham is inconsistent with Tellabs).  The Seventh 
Circuit revisited the use of CWs approximately six months after Higginbotham was decided, 
when it considered Tellabs on remand from the Supreme Court.  See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 
v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Tellabs II”).  In that case, the Seventh Circuit 
purported to distinguish Higginbotham and its steep discounting of allegations based on 
information provided by CWs.  Whereas Higginbotham’s confidential sources included three ex-
employees of defendant and two consultants for defendant, none of whose positions were 
described with particularity, Tellabs II involved CWs whom the Seventh Circuit described as 
numerous and consisting of persons who from their job descriptions were in a position to know 
first-hand the facts to which they were prepared to testify.  While Tellabs II can be and has been 
read to represent a retreat from Higginbotham, the earlier case is alive and well.  Nothing in 
Higginbotham suggests that the Seventh Circuit’s holding concerning the steep discounting of 
allegations by confidential witnesses was limited to the specific facts of that case.  Moreover, 
post-Tellabs II the Seventh Circuit restated the conclusions it drew in Higginbotham.  See City of 
Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. & Local 295/Local 581 v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 
2013) (“Allegations concerning . . . unnamed confidential sources of damaging information 
require a heavy discount.  The sources may be ill-informed, may be acting from spite rather than 
knowledge, may be misrepresented, may even be nonexistent—a gimmick for obtaining 
discovery costly to the defendants and maybe forcing settlement or inducing more favorable 
settlement terms.”). 
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A second recurring issue is whether the names of CWs are 
discoverable.  Most courts have held that the PSLRA does not require 
plaintiffs to identify by name the anonymous sources they use in their 
complaints.26  In general, however, the witnesses must be “described in 
the complaint with sufficient particularity to support the probability that 
a person in the position occupied by the source would possess the 
information alleged.”27  Discovery is a different matter.  Most federal 
district courts to consider the issue have held that the identities of 
confidential witnesses who provide information set forth in a securities 
fraud complaint are generally discoverable, once the PSLRA’s 
discovery stay has been lifted.28  A sizable minority has held that the 
identities are protected from disclosure as attorney work product and/or 
on public policy grounds.29  No federal appellate court had resolved the 
issue by early 2014. 
A third recurring issue, which has become especially contentious in 
the last few years, is how courts should handle the problem of CWs who 
recant the information attributed to them in complaints, or deny that 
they ever provided such information, after their identities have been 
discovered.  This third issue is the primary subject of this Article, which 
proceeds in three parts.   
Part I examines the incidence of recanting by CWs in securities 
litigation, Part II considers four recent high-profile cases involving 
alleged recanting, and Part III discusses insights to be drawn from the 
recanting cases.  The fundamental conclusions are four-fold: (a) courts 
should refuse to permit the depositions of CWs while motions to 
dismiss are pending and should decline to consider the affidavits of 
 
26. See Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. CORP. L. 551, 558 
(2011) (identifying federal circuit courts rejecting notion that CWs who provide information used 
in securities fraud complaints must be identified by name in the complaints). 
27. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000); Dawes v. Imperial Sugar 
Co., No. H-11-3250, 2013 WL 5442109, at *18 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 27, 2013).  Courts do not permit 
plaintiffs to provide this information in camera, in lieu of setting it forth in a complaint.  See 
Joseph C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June 
23, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles/172877/unmasking-confidential-witnesses (noting 
that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to allow plaintiffs to 
provide information regarding confidential witnesses in camera). 
28. See generally Jennifer H. Rearden & Darcy C. Harris, Growing Trend Favors Disclosure 
of Witnesses’ Identities, 23 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Fall 2012), available at 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ReardenHarrisGrowingTrendFavorsDisclos
ureofWitnessesIdentities.pdf (noting that courts have increasingly required confidential witnesses 
to reveal their identities during discovery). 
29. See Flaum & David, supra note 17, at 1.  See generally Jeff G. Hammel & Elizabeth R. 
Marks, Confidential Witnesses: Reliable Source or Imaginary Friend?, 45 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
(BNA) 1300 (2013) (discussing district court split on discoverability of CWs). 
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allegedly recanting witnesses in connection with such motions; (b) 
plaintiffs’ counsel should participate in the pre-filing interviews of their 
CWs, rather than delegating the task to their investigators; (c) some 
CWs who recant—perhaps many of them—do so falsely, under 
pressure; and (d) false recanting occurs in part because courts permit 
discovery of confidential witnesses. 
I. THE INCIDENCE OF RECANTING 
As noted above, the PSLRA imposes an automatic stay of discovery 
and other proceedings while motions to dismiss are pending.30  When 
the motions to dismiss are denied, the stay is lifted.  In most cases 
defendants then seek discovery of plaintiffs’ confidential witnesses, 
primarily to test whether the witnesses will confirm the information 
attributed to them in plaintiffs’ complaint.31  And, as noted above, the 
unmistakable trend is for federal district courts to permit such discovery 
to occur.  When defendants ascertain the identities of CWs and depose 
them, the opportunity arises for the witnesses to recant, deny, or modify 
some or all of the information attributed to them by plaintiffs.  In some 
recent high-profile cases, such recanting32 has occurred, or has been 
alleged to have occurred.  The new version of events can be used by 
defendants to support a motion for full or partial summary judgment.  
But, as indicated below, evidence of recanting often becomes available 
in the form of declarations or affidavits even before the discovery stay 
has been lifted.  In these situations, the evidence has been used by 
defendants, properly or not, to support motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”), 
motions to strike under Rule 12(f), motions for reconsideration of 
denials of motions to dismiss, and/or motions for sanctions under Rule 
11. 
How common is recanting?  There is some dispute about this.  Some 
commentators believe that recanting is quite common.33  But a review 
 
30. See supra text accompanying notes 6–15. 
31. See Carl H. Loewenson, Jr. & James J. Beha II, Reliability of Confidential Witnesses in 
Securities Fraud Complaints, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 2013, at 2 (“Once a case proceeds to discovery, 
however, defendants are typically able to learn the identities of confidential witnesses and probe 
the accuracy of their statements.”). 
32. “Recanting” is sometimes characterized in criminal cases as an unequivocal repudiation of 
prior testimony.  See, e.g., United States v. Tobias, 863 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988).  In this 
Article, the term is sometimes used more broadly to also include denials that purported statements 
were ever made, and modifications of prior statements. 
33. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Dickey & Brian M. Lutz, The SEC’s Final Whistleblower Rules: 
The Floodgates Open on a New Wave of Whistleblower Claims, as the SEC Authorizes Massive 
Bounties to Anonymous Tipsters, 8 SEC. LITIG. REP. 1, 5 (2011) (asserting that CWs “have shown 
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of recent cases suggests the incidence of actual recanting may be lower 
than is often asserted.  In some cases the declarations submitted by 
allegedly recanting CWs reflected only immaterial differences between 
the declarations and plaintiffs’ complaints.  For example, in 
Minneapolis Firefighters’ Relief Ass’n v. Medtronic,34 the court 
concluded that differences between the declarations of thirteen CWs and 
the allegations in plaintiffs’ amended complaint were “mostly 
innocuous”35 and, with regard to many of the witnesses, the declarations 
merely challenged the implications drawn in the complaint.36  Similarly, 
in Local 703, I.B. of T. Grocery & Food Employees Welfare Fund v. 
Regions Financial Corp.,37 the court, after reviewing affidavits from 
allegedly recanting CWs and the interview notes from plaintiffs’ 
investigator, concluded that “nothing in the affidavit statements of the 
CWs contradict[s] the statements in the Amended Complaint.”38  And in 
BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Securities Litigation (“BankAtlantic”)39 the 
 
themselves to be far too easily coaxed by plaintiffs’ counsel or their private investigators to 
misrepresent, exaggerate, or misstate the facts”); Alison Frankel, The Confidential Witness 
Conundrum in Securities Class Actions, REUTERS, Sept. 20, 2012 [hereinafter Frankel, 
Confidential Witness Conundrum], available at http://investorshub.advfn.com/ 
boards/read_msg.aspx?message_id=79784848 (“[T]he truth is that just about every major 
securities class action firm has seen witnesses say one thing to plaintiffs’ investigators and 
another to former employers after their identity is revealed.”); Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve 
the Flawed Confidential Witness Issue, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/ how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidential-witness-issue (re- 
ferring to the “recurring and pervasive problem” of flawed CW allegations, but noting that many 
cases involve only “garden variety inaccuracies”); Kevin LaCroix, The Confidential Witness 
Problem in Securities Litigation, D&O DIARY (July 15, 2013, 4:18 AM), http://www.dan 
dodiary.com/2013/07/articles/securities-litigation/the-confidential-witness-problem-in-securities-
litigation/ (“The pattern recurs often that after the dismissal motion is denied, and the witnesses’ 
identities are known and their testimony is questioned, the witnesses recant.”). 
34. 278 F.R.D. 454, 463 (D. Minn. 2011). 
35. Id. at 463–64 
36. See id. at 463 (“As with most of the witnesses, what [CW-12] takes issue with are the 
implications that can be drawn from the way Plaintiffs presented his statements or the information 
he gave them.  But this disagreement does not amount to proof that Plaintiffs misrepresented 
anything.”). 
37. No. CV 10-J-2847-IPJ (N.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2011) (order denying defendant’s motion to 
reconsider and/or certify for interlocutory appeal). 
38. Id. at 8.  In a subsequent order, the court noted that plaintiffs’ investigator provided the 
court with an eight-page signed affidavit, in which she asserted that the information she provided 
to plaintiffs’ counsel for use in the complaint was true and correct.  See Local 703, I.B. of T. 
Grocery and Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., No. CV 10-J-2847-S, 2012 WL 
6049724, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 4, 2012) (documenting the court’s receipt of the signed affidavit).  
But cf. In re Cabletron Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 30, 34 (D.N.H. 2006) (noting that 
information in CW affidavits obtained by defendants was “far less incriminating” than the court 
had been led to believe by plaintiffs’ second amended complaint). 
39. 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, 
Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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court found that, with respect to five of six CWs, there was no basis to 
conclude that the allegations attributed to them in the first amended 
consolidated complaint lacked evidentiary support.40 
II. RECENT CASES INVOLVING ALLEGED RECANTING BY CONFIDENTIAL 
WITNESSES 
Courts confronted with alleged recanting by CWs in securities fraud 
cases have taken a variety of approaches.  These contrasting approaches, 
taken in some of the most prominent cases involving this issue, are 
discussed below. 
A. Campo 
Campo v. Sears Holdings Corp.41 is one of the first major cases to 
consider the problem of flawed allegations by confidential witnesses.  In 
Campo, former shareholders of Kmart Holding Corporation sued Sears 
Holdings Corporation (the legal successor to Kmart), the former 
chairman of Sears, and the former chief executive officer of Kmart for 
alleged securities violations.  Plaintiff’s complaint relied heavily on 
information provided by three confidential witnesses.42  Defendants 
moved to dismiss, and that motion was denied without prejudice in 
2008 based on information allegedly provided by the CWs.43  
Subsequently, the court ordered the depositions in 2009 of the CWs to 
determine whether they supported the allegations attributed to them in 
the complaint, and whether the motion to dismiss should have been 
granted.  After considering only those allegations by the CWs that were 
corroborated by them in depositions,44 the court reversed course and 
granted the motion to dismiss.45  On appeal, the Second Circuit 
unanimously affirmed the judgment of the district court in an 
unpublished Summary Order.  Citing Higginbotham, it found no error in 
the court’s order that the confidential witnesses be deposed or in the 
court’s consideration of their deposition testimony in weighing 
 
40. Id. at 1312.  However, the court reached a different conclusion with respect to the sixth 
CW.  The court found a Rule 11 violation with respect to use by plaintiffs of this witness.  
Because the plaintiffs cited this CW as a source of information in only five paragraphs of the 
ninety-eight-page first amended consolidated complaint, the violation was de minimus, and 
defendants were awarded only the reasonable fees and expenses they incurred in deposing that 
witness and one-tenth of the reasonable fees and expenses they incurred in preparing their motion 
for sanctions.  Id. at 1321–22. 
41. 635 F. Supp. 2d 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 371 F. App’x 212 (2d Cir. 2010). 
42. Id. at 335. 
43. Id. at 330 n.54. 
44. Id. at 330. 
45. Id. at 336. 
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plaintiff’s allegations.46  According to the Second Circuit, the district 
court “relied upon the deposition testimony for the limited purpose of 
determining whether the CWs acknowledged the statements attributed 
to them in the complaint.”47  However, the Second Circuit also 
remarked that anonymity frustrates the process for weighing inferences 
that was set forth in Tellabs.48 
B. SunTrust 
In Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc. (“SunTrust”),49 
plaintiff brought a putative class action against defendant SunTrust 
Banks, Inc., its auditor, and related defendants, alleging securities 
violations.  Defendants successfully moved to dismiss, but plaintiff was 
given leave to amend.  Defendants moved to dismiss the amended 
complaint, which included numerous allegations attributed to a CW, but 
that motion was unsuccessful.50  Defendants later moved for 
reconsideration, on the basis of three declarations submitted by the 
confidential witness, who by that point was no longer anonymous.51  In 
his declarations the CW contradicted several of the statements attributed 
to him in the amended complaint and denied having ever made such 
statements to plaintiff’s investigators.52  On the basis of these 
declarations the court granted the motion for reconsideration and 
dismissed the amended complaint.53  The court found that, based on the 
CW’s declarations, “the positions Plaintiff took in its Amended 
Complaint were misleading or, at least, unsupported.”54  The court did 
not, however, impose Rule 11 sanctions.55 
C. Boeing 
 Another prominent decision on this topic is the Seventh Circuit’s 
2013 opinion in the securities fraud class action against the Boeing 
Company.56  In that case plaintiffs sued Boeing and two executives who 
 
46. Campo, 371 F. App’x at 216 n.4. 
47. Id.  Under the Second Circuit’s rules this decision does not have precedential effect, but 
may be cited. 
48. Id. 
49. 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (N.D. Ga. 2012). 
50. Id. at 1217. 
51. Id. at 1220–22. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 1233. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. and Local 295/Local 581 v. Boeing, 711 F.3d 754 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
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allegedly deceived investors regarding stress tests conducted on 
Boeing’s new 787-8 Dreamliner aircraft.  The first amended complaint 
was dismissed without prejudice by the district court.  The second 
amended complaint included four new paragraphs concerning a CW 
described as Boeing’s senior structural analyst engineer and chief 
engineer.  Expressly relying on the new allegations attributed to the 
CW, the district court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the second 
amended complaint.57  Subsequently, the CW was identified and 
deposed, and he denied virtually everything that plaintiffs’ investigator 
had reported.58  In fact, he had never been a Boeing employee.  He had 
been employed by a contractor for Boeing, but he denied that he ever 
worked on the Dreamliner 787-8, the model in question.59  Moreover, 
none of the plaintiffs’ lawyers had met or talked to the CW until six 
months after they filed the second amended complaint,60 which 
included allegations based on information allegedly provided by him.  
Following his deposition the district court granted defendants’ motion 
for reconsideration and dismissed the case with prejudice.61  On appeal, 
the Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Richard Posner (who was 
part of the earlier Higginbotham panel), cited Higginbotham, affirmed 
the dismissal of the action, and remanded for consideration as to 
whether sanctions should be imposed on plaintiffs’ lawyers under Rule 
11.62 
D. Lockheed 
As of this writing the most recent opinion involving alleged recanting 
was issued post-settlement by Judge Jed Rakoff in July 2013 in the 
securities fraud class action against Lockheed Martin Corporation.63  In 
that case, plaintiff, an institutional investor, sued Lockheed and some of 
 
57. City of Livonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., No. 09 C 7143, 2011 WL 824604, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2011). 
58. 711 F.3d at 760. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Boeing, 2011 WL 824604, at *5. 
62. Boeing, 711 F.3d at 762.  The PSLRA requires that upon final adjudication of private 
securities actions, courts shall include in the record specific findings regarding compliance by 
each party and each attorney representing any party with each requirement of Rule 11(b) as to any 
complaint, responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.  If a party is determined to have violated 
Rule 11, the PSLRA requires that sanctions be imposed after giving such party or attorney notice 
and an opportunity to respond.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c) (2012).  Following remand in Boeing, 
briefing on the sanctions issue was completed in December 2013.  The district court had not 
resolved the issue by mid-March 2014. 
63. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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its directors and officers, principally alleging that defendants had made 
statements about the first-quarter 2009 performance of one of 
Lockheed’s divisions that they knew were materially misleading.64  
Plaintiff’s amended complaint relied heavily on information purportedly 
provided by multiple CWs, who were current or former Lockheed 
employees.65  Defendants moved to dismiss, and that motion was 
denied,66 in part on the basis of the information attributed to the CWs.  
Discovery then commenced.  Defendants obtained the names of the 
CWs and deposed them.  Defendants then moved for partial summary 
judgment, asserting that in their depositions several of the CWs had 
recanted or denied making the statements attributed to them.  In 
response, plaintiff argued that if the CWs had changed their stories, this 
was only because Lockheed had pressured them to do so.67 
Judge Rakoff sua sponte ordered plaintiff’s investigator and the five 
CWs implicated by defendants’ assertions to appear and testify in court 
at the October 2012 hearing on defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.  After hearing testimony Rakoff denied defendants’ motion 
in a summary order, with an opinion to follow.68  The case then settled.  
Later, in July 2013, Rakoff issued a post-settlement opinion69 
explaining his denial of the motion for summary judgment and making 
some important observations about the CWs and the investigator in the 
case.  With respect to the investigator, Judge Rakoff concluded that 
“[the investigator’s] report of his findings to plaintiff’s counsel was 
accurate in all material respects.”70  With respect to the CWs, Rakoff 
noted that their testimony “bore witness to the competing pressures this 
process has placed on [them] and the impact such pressures had had on 
their ability to tell the truth.”71  He also noted that some of the CWs 
“had been lured by the investigator into stating as ‘facts’ what often 
were merely surmises, but then, when their indiscretions were revealed, 
felt pressured into denying outright statements they had actually 
 
64. Id. at 635. 
65. Id. 
66. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 875 F. Supp. 2d 359, 
375 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
67. Lockheed, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 
68. See City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11 Civ. 
5026(JSR), 2012 WL 6429784 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2012) (denying defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment without expressing opinion on the underlying merit of the pending “omnibus” 
motion for summary judgment). 
69. Lockheed, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 633. 
70. Id. at 637. 
71. Id. at 636. 
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made.”72  Judge Rakoff ultimately determined that the record did not 
support a finding of misconduct by plaintiff’s counsel or investigator.73  
Finally, Rakoff concluded that the combined effect of the PSLRA and 
cases like Tellabs was likely to make problems associated with the use 
of CWs “endemic.”74 
III. INSIGHTS FROM THE RECANTING CASES 
The cases described above yield several insights and suggestions for 
best practices concerning the issue of confidential witnesses who recant.  
Those insights and suggestions are described below. 
A. Courts Should Refuse to Permit the Depositions of CWs While 
Motions to Dismiss are Pending 
The first insight concerns the Campo case, which permitted the 
depositions of CWs prior to resolving a motion to dismiss.  In the 
aftermath of the Second Circuit’s decision in 2010, many defense 
lawyers expected and hoped that Campo would initiate a trend.75  It did 
not, and that is appropriate, because Campo was decided incorrectly 
with respect to this issue.   
Post-Campo, those courts to consider the issue have rejected attempts 
to depose CWs prior to resolving motions to dismiss.  They have done 
so for multiple reasons.  First, the PSLRA’s automatic discovery stay 
prohibits the taking of such depositions during the pendency of motions 
to dismiss.76  Second, the consideration by a court of deposition 
testimony in this situation violates Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules, 
 
72. Id. at 637. 
73. Id. at 637–38. 
74. Id. at 638.  Judge Rakoff gave final approval to the settlement two weeks later.  See City 
of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., No. 11 Civ. 5026(JSR), 2013 WL 
3796658 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013) (holding that the proposed settlement was fair, reasonable, and 
adequate). 
75. See Bryan B. House, The Fact Pattern Behind the Boeing Class Action Grounding, 
LAW360 (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/429130/the-fact-pattern-behind-the-
boeing-class-action-grounding; see also Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31, at 3 (“[W]hen 
defendants can identify with particularity potential inaccuracies or discrepancies in confidential 
witness statements, courts should permit pre-motion-to-dismiss discovery into the identity and 
reliability of confidential witnesses.”); Joseph C. Weinstein & Joseph P. Rodgers, Unmasking 
Confidential Witnesses?, LAW360 (June 23, 2010), http://www.law360.com/articles 
/172877/unmasking-confidential-witnesses (“Many securities litigators believe Campo is a step in 
the right direction.”). 
76. See, e.g., Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1217 
n.6 (N.D. Ga. 2012) (noting court’s prior refusal to life discovery stay to permit deposition of 
CW); In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Sec. Litig., 836 F. Supp. 2d 878, 912 n.15 (D. Minn. 2011); In re 
Cell Therapeutics, Inc., No. C10-414MJP, 2010 WL 4791808, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2010). 
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which generally prohibits consideration of material beyond the 
pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.77  Third, the Second 
Circuit’s assertion that anonymity frustrates the inference-weighing 
requirement set forth in Tellabs reflects an overbroad reading of the 
Supreme Court’s decision, “which is confined to discussions of 
inferences drawn from the allegations of the complaint.”78  Fourth, the 
endorsement by the Second Circuit of the district court’s approach in 
Campo was non-binding dicta.79 
Courts have taken conflicting approaches when confronted with a 
closely-related issue: the submission of declarations or affidavits from 
recanting CWs whose identities have been uncovered by defendants 
before the discovery stay has been lifted.  In In re St. Jude Medical, Inc. 
Securities Litigation,80 defendants identified one of plaintiffs’ CWs and 
submitted her affidavit during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.  The 
affidavit asserted that the complaint misrepresented her recollections.81  
After expressing doubt about the propriety of addressing the factual 
accuracy of an affidavit on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court decided to 
ignore the few allegations attributed solely to that witness.82 
In Waldrep v. ValueClick, Inc.,83 plaintiffs’ securities class action 
complaint included information purportedly provided by six 
confidential witnesses.84  After the complaint was filed, defendants 
independently identified, located, and interviewed the CWs.  
Defendants then obtained declarations from the six witnesses, which 
directly contradicted the information attributed to them in the 
complaint.  Defendants moved to dismiss and for Rule 11 sanctions.  
Plaintiffs moved to strike the declarations, or alternatively, for 
discovery related to the Rule 11 motion.85  The court denied the motions 
by both plaintiffs and defendants.86 
 
77. In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc., 2010 WL 4791808, at *2; cf. In re St. Jude Med., 836 F. 
Supp. 2d at 901 n.9 (expressing doubt about the propriety of addressing the factual accuracy of an 
affidavit submitted by a CW in connection with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). 
78. In re Cell Therapeutics, Inc., 2010 WL 4791808, at *1 n.2. 
79. Id. at *2.  Commentators have been critical of Campo.  See, e.g., Kaufman & Wunderlich, 
supra note 24, at 59 & n.22 (2012) (asserting that the decision violates both the PSLRA’s 
discovery stay and Rule 12(d)). 
80. 836 F. Supp. 2d at 878. 
81. Id. at 901 n.9. 
82. Id.  The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part.  Id. at 912. 
83. No. CV 07-05411 DDP (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. 2008) (order denying plaintiffs’ motion to 
strike the declarations of the confidential witnesses). 
84. Id. at 1. 
85. Id. at 2. 
86. Id. 
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In In re ProQuest Securities Litigation (“ProQuest”),87 defendant 
ProQuest sought and obtained a declaration from a confidential witness 
who denied most of the allegations attributed to her in the first 
consolidated class action complaint.  The federal district court 
concluded that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from that CW 
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, ProQuest “engaged in 
discovery which was wholly improper.”88  The court neither struck the 
offending declaration on the ground that it violated the discovery stay, 
nor imposed Rule 11 sanctions for pleading allegations in bad faith.  
Instead, when ruling on the dismissal motion, it chose to discount, but 
not ignore, the information attributed to the CW in the complaint.89 
In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Securities Litigation90 (“Par 
Pharmaceutical”) is a fourth case raising this same issue.  In this case, 
defendants moved for Rule 11 sanctions during the pendency of their 
motion to dismiss, on the basis of a declaration they obtained from 
plaintiffs’ CW-1.  The witness claimed in her declaration that a private 
investigator hired by plaintiffs misquoted her, took information out of 
context, and ignored other information provided by her in order to make 
improper inferences and conclusions.91  Plaintiffs moved to strike the 
declaration, on the basis that its submission violated the PSLRA’s 
automatic stay provision.92  The court, after citing ProQuest’s “cautious 
approach,”93 granted plaintiffs’ motion to strike the declaration 
submitted by CW-1 and denied defendants’ motion to strike the 
paragraphs in the second amended complaint that were based on the 
disputed information.94 
The court in Par Pharmaceutical declined to endorse “any rule per 
se.”95  The absence of such a rule has resulted in the judicial 
inconsistency exemplified by the cases discussed above.  There should 
be a uniform approach to this issue, and it should be the same one taken 
by courts rejecting Campo.  As indicated, those courts considering the 
issue have concluded, contrary to Campo, that permitting the 
depositions of CWs before the discovery stay is lifted violates the 
 
87. 527 F. Supp. 2d 728 (E.D. Mich. 2007). 
88. Id. at 740. 
89. Id.  The motion to dismiss was denied.  Id. at 747. 
90. No. 06-cv-3226 (PGS), 2009 WL 3234273 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2009). 
91. Id. at *11. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at *12. 
94. Id.  The case later settled.  See In re Par Pharm. Sec. Litig., No. 06-3226 (ES), 2013 WL 
3930091, at *8 (D.N.J. July 29, 2013) (approving final settlement following fairness hearing). 
95. Par Pharmaceutical, 2009 WL 3234273, at *12. 
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PSLRA.  The same conclusion should apply with respect to the 
submission of declarations or affidavits from recanting CWs.  The 
PSLRA requires that “all discovery and other proceedings” be stayed 
pending any motion to dismiss.96  Courts have tended to interpret this 
provision broadly.97  As such, the submission of a declaration from a 
recanting CW during the pendency of a motion to dismiss may 
constitute “discovery” or “other proceedings,” and thus fall within the 
ambit of the PSLRA’s stay.  As noted, in Par Pharmaceutical the court 
did strike a recanting CW’s affidavit,98 and in ProQuest the court 
concluded that by seeking and obtaining a declaration from a CW 
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss, defendant engaged in 
discovery which was wholly improper.99  Other courts have held that 
the PSLRA’s automatic stay does not encompass investigatory 
interviews conducted during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.100  
But those cases can be distinguished, at least in part because they did 
not involve submission to the court of recanting affidavits.  They merely 
involved interviews of prospective witnesses.101 
In any event, whether or not a recanting confidential witness did 
make statements attributed to him in a complaint is essentially a 
credibility question,102 and a motion to dismiss is not the proper vehicle 
to test the credibility of witnesses.  The Supreme Court was clear in 
Tellabs that credibility assessments are within the purview of the 
ultimate trier of fact.103  Accordingly, courts should decline to consider 
affidavits or declarations from recanting CWs when deciding motions to 
 
96. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
97. See, e.g., Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., Nos. 1:02CV157, 1:02CV370, 1:02CV382, 2002 
WL 32121836, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 2002) (observing that “the reference in the [PSLRA] 
statute to a stay of ‘all discovery’ is to be interpreted broadly”). 
98. See infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. 
99. See infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
100. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133–34 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs had not established a justification for lifting the stay); In re 
Tyco Int’l Ltd. Sec. Litig., No. 00-MD-1335-B, 2001 WL 3407521, at *2–3 (D.N.H. Jan. 30, 
2001) (denying a request to prohibit third party interviews). 
101. See, e.g., In re JDS Uniphase Corp., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34 (noting that the PSLRA 
does not prohibit interviewing prospective witnesses). 
102. See In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 
2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012) 
 (“Whether the confidential witnesses initially made the statements attributed to them in the 
complaints is essentially a credibility question.”); Wu Group v. Synopsis, Inc., No. C 04-3580 
MJJ, 2005 WL 1926626, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2005) (“[W]hether the [CW] statements were 
made is essentially a credibility question.”). 
103. The Supreme Court stated that it is “within the jury’s authority to assess the credibility of 
witnesses, resolve genuine issues of fact, and make the ultimate determination whether 
[defendants] acted with scienter.”  551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007). 
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dismiss or motions to reconsider denials of motions to dismiss. 
B. Plaintiffs’ Counsel Should Participate in the Interviews of Their 
CWs 
A common element in many of the securities cases involving CWs  
who recant, in whole or in part, is that the pre-filing interviews of the 
CWs were conducted only by investigators for plaintiffs’ counsel, and 
not by counsel themselves.  This was true, for example, in Boeing, 
where none of plaintiffs’ lawyers met or spoke with their CW until six 
months after the filing of the operative second amended complaint.104  
It also was true in BankAtlantic, where class counsel relied on the 
detailed notes and memoranda provided by their investigators, who 
conducted the CW interviews.105  And it was true in Applestein v. 
Medivation, Inc.106  In that case the district court dismissed with 
prejudice a third amended securities fraud complaint based largely on 
information allegedly provided by three CWs.107  The court concluded 
that the information attributed to two of the CWs contradicted 
information provided by these same witnesses in the prior second 
amended complaint, as well as information attributed to a third CW.108  
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ counsel 
acknowledged that neither they nor their investigators had spoken to 
two of the three CWs, and instead they relied on hearsay statements 
passed onto the third witness.109  Similarly, in SunTrust, plaintiffs’ 
confidential witness never met plaintiffs’ investigators in person and 
apparently never communicated at all with plaintiffs’ attorneys.110 
The failure by counsel for plaintiffs to directly participate in the pre-
filing interviews of the CWs that they plan to rely upon for the key 
allegations in their complaints does not by itself constitute a Rule 11 
violation.  An attorney has a non-delegable duty to analyze the facts and 
law that support a pleading or motion, but that duty does not extend to 
 
104. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
105. BankAtlantic, 851 F. Supp. 2d at 1311. 
106. 861 F. Supp. 2d 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2012). 
107. Id. at 1038–39, 1044. 
108. Id. at 1038. 
109. Id. at 1038–39. 
110. See Belmont Holdings Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1232 (N.D. 
Ga. 2012) (“It appears here that no lawyer representing Plaintiff ever met with or interviewed [the 
CW] about what he knew, whether he was credible, or even how long he actually worked for 
SunTrust and the currency of his knowledge.”); Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (noting that in 
SunTrust, the CW never met in-person with plaintiffs’ investigators and never communicated at 
all with plaintiffs’ counsel). 
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personally gathering the facts.111  Nevertheless, the failure by plaintiffs’ 
counsel to directly participate in the pre-filing interviews of CWs is a 
likely source of many of the problems that have developed in recent 
years.  Any witness, confidential or not, may speculate or provide 
opinions, rather than facts.  And an investigator may mistake a witness’ 
conjecture for fact.112  Later, when the investigator transmits his 
interview notes or report to counsel, this may result in the drafting of 
complaints that fail to reflect the CWs’ factual knowledge.  If counsel 
were to directly participate in the interviews, then the foregoing 
problems likely would be reduced, at least in part because an 
experienced litigator should be better-equipped than an investigator to 
distinguish conjecture from fact.113  At the same time, the value of 
information provided by CWs would increase, perhaps significantly so.  
Of course, counsel could improperly interpret, infer, and/or extrapolate, 
based on information provided to them by a CW.  But it is likely this 
would occur less often than when only the investigator conducts the 
interview. 
Some plaintiffs’ counsel have argued that it would be unethical for 
them to personally interview CWs, because it could subject them to 
being called to testify as witnesses in the securities litigation in which 
the information from the CWs is to be used.114  This argument is 
meritless.  If correct, the argument would preclude lawyers from 
evaluating the credibility of their own potential witnesses in any civil or 
criminal action.115 
As a best practice, plaintiffs’ counsel should conduct CW interviews 
in conjunction with counsel’s investigators.116  But this will not always 
 
111. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1311 (S.D. Fla. 
2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th Cir. 2012). 
112. Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31, at 3. 
113. See id. (“[M]any problems raised by the use of confidential witnesses could be solved 
simply by requiring plaintiffs’ counsel to take a more active role in assuring the reliability of pre-
complaint factual investigations.”). 
114. See SunTrust, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 1232 (noting that this argument would be a “dubious 
and unprecedented interpretation of any professional ethics code”). 
115. See id. at 1232 n.21 (“Plaintiff’s misguided interpretation of attorney participation in 
interviews would prohibit prosecutors from interviewing witnesses during criminal investigations 
and prohibit a responsible lawyer from evaluating witness credibility during the investigation of 
criminal charges or civil claims.”). 
116. See Matthew Tolve, Christin Hill & William Alderman, Say Hello to My Imaginary 
Friend! Judge Posner, Seventh Circuit Issue Stern Warning to Plaintiffs’ Firms for Again Citing 
Bogus Confidential Witnesses, ORRICK SEC. LITIG. & REG. ENFORCEMENT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://blogs.orrick.com/securitieslitigation/2013/04/02/say-hello-to-my-imaginary-friend-judge-
posner-seventh-circuit-issue-stern-warning-to-plaintiffsfirms-for-again-citing-bogus-confidential-
witnesses/ (“[T]he takeaway is clear: plaintiffs’ counsel needs to talk to the witnesses it cites in a 
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happen.  At a minimum, if counsel refrain from participating directly in 
CW interviews, then they should ensure that their investigators follow 
best practices.  In Lockheed, plaintiff’s investigator did not meet with 
the confidential witnesses in-person, did not tape-record his telephone 
calls with them, and did not ask any member of his staff to join him on 
his telephone calls with the witnesses.  Instead, the investigator chose to 
rely on his non-stenographic notes of the telephonic conversations, 
made contemporaneously as the calls took place.117  As noted by Judge 
Rakoff, these interview practices “were less rigorous than would have 
been typical of, say, a federal law enforcement agent.”118  In Lockheed, 
the investigator’s report of his findings was accurate in all material 
respects,119 notwithstanding the foregoing.  This may or may not have 
been the result of good fortune.  As a matter of best practices, however, 
investigators interviewing CWs in securities cases should meet in-
person with the witnesses and record the interviews or should conduct 
the interviews with at least one member of the investigator’s staff also 
present and taking contemporaneous notes.  If distance or other factors 
render in-person interviews unfeasible, then the telephonic interviews 
should be recorded. 
Some members of the defense bar have suggested that courts should 
require complaints in securities cases to include factual allegations 
about the experience and reliability of the investigators that plaintiffs 
use, or about the pre-case investigation itself.120  Such a requirement 
seems unnecessary, unduly burdensome, and difficult to apply.  It is 
unclear, for example, what kind of allegations would suffice as to the 
reliability of an investigator.  Moreover, requiring a complaint to 
include specific details about plaintiffs’ pre-case investigation would 
risk the forced disclosure of attorney work product. 
It also has been suggested that plaintiffs’ counsel should be required 
to obtain from each of their CWs a declaration and/or a certification that 
he has read the complaint and agrees with the description of the 
 
complaint, not rely exclusively on the reports of its investigators, even more so when those 
investigators express doubt about the information they’ve uncovered.”).  But cf. Max Stendahl, 
Robbins Geller Says Boeing Suit Doesn’t Warrant Sanctions, LAW360 (Oct. 29, 2013), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/483969/robbins-geller-says-boeing-suit-doesn-t-warrant-
sanctions (citing plaintiffs’ counsel in Boeing for proposition that prosecutors commonly and 
properly delegate to investigators the task of interviewing witnesses). 
117. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 
637 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (proposing that courts require “factual allegations 
about investigators’ experience and reliability or about the pre-case investigation itself”). 
Mark.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  10:44 PM 
2014] Recanting Confidential Witnesses   595 
information he has provided.121  According to one proponent of this 
requirement, “it would prevent most CW problems, and make the ones 
that do arise much easier to resolve.”122  It may indeed be the case, as 
suggested, that most credible CWs with accurate information to provide 
would want to provide a certification, to avoid the major disruption that 
can result if a complaint does not accurately reflect the witness’ 
account.123  But this proposal may come accompanied by logistical 
problems.  For example, if the certifications are to be filed 
contemporaneously with the filing of the complaint, they might need to 
be filed under seal and made inaccessible to defendants, to preserve the 
CWs’ anonymity at the pleading stage of litigation.  If the certifications 
are not to be filed at the onset of a case, but instead to be held by 
plaintiffs’ counsel, certainly they should be discoverable once discovery 
commences. 
More troublesome is the situation where a CW is identified by 
defendants, who submit a recanting declaration from one of plaintiff’s 
CWs during the pendency of a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
reconsideration following denial of a motion to dismiss.  For the reasons 
indicated above, defendants should be precluded from submitting such a 
declaration.  Arguably the submission violates the automatic stay.  
Moreover, submission of a recanting declaration, followed by unsealing 
(or submission) of the CW’s certification, would require the court to 
make a credibility determination in connection with a motion to dismiss.  
Again, for the reasons indicated above, such a determination should not 
be made at this stage of the litigation. 
C. Some CWs Falsely Recant Because They Feel Pressure to Do So 
It is clear that some and perhaps much of the recanting by CWs that 
has taken place in recent years in securities cases has resulted from 
pressure and/or fear of retaliation by defendants.  Counsel for plaintiffs 
in securities class actions assert that such recanting as a result of 
pressure is quite common.124  Plaintiffs made a form of this argument in 
Boeing.  According to plaintiffs, the CW lied at his deposition because 
 
121. See Douglas W. Greene, How to Solve the Flawed Confidential Witness Issue, LAW360  
(Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.law360.com/articles/430766/how-to-solve-the-flawed-confidential-
witness-issue (discussing three reforms to solve the CW problem). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. See, e.g., LaCroix, supra note 33 (citing unidentified leading plaintiffs’ lawyer for 
proposition that “confidential witnesses always recant, because of the financial and other pressure 
their employer can bring to bear on them, regardless of how precise, specific and detailed their 
prior testimony had been”). 
Mark.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  10:44 PM 
596 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol.  45 
he wanted to remain in the good graces of defendant Boeing.125  
Specifically, according to plaintiffs, the CW wanted to obtain a job with 
Boeing.126  The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument, observing that 
“left unexplained is why he would not have wanted to remain in those 
good graces when he was interviewed by [plaintiffs’] investigator.”127  
A reasonable answer to that question is that when he was interviewed 
by plaintiffs’ investigator his identity as plaintiffs’ CW was unknown to 
Boeing.  At his deposition, of course, his identity was known to Boeing, 
and the risk of falling out of favor with the company was substantially 
greater.  As the court noted in BankAtlantic, discrepancies between 
statements attributed to a confidential witness in a complaint and the 
CW’s subsequent deposition testimony may be attributed to “the desire 
to remain in a former employer’s good graces once the protection of 
confidentiality has been removed.”128 
The Second Circuit has observed that imposing a general requirement 
of disclosure of confidential sources could deter informants from 
providing critical information to investigators in meritorious cases or 
invite retaliation against them.129  Numerous other courts have 
agreed.130  This chilling effect and risk of retaliation are precisely why 
federal courts have adopted a general rule that CWs need not be 
identified by name in securities fraud complaints.131  But even as the 
chilling effect and risk of retaliation have been minimized at the 
pleading stage, such adverse effects have multiplied as federal courts 
have permitted discovery of CWs both before (as in Campo) and after 
the PSLRA’s discovery stay has been lifted. 
Retaliation can take many different forms, some more subtle than 
others, including: being fired, socially ostracized, intimidated, 
 
125. City of Latonia Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 711 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 2013). 
126. See Greene, supra note 33 (noting plaintiffs’ argument that CW’s recantation was caused 
by his desire to work directly for Boeing). 
127. Boeing, 711 F.3d at 760. 
128. In re BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 851 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1312 
(S.D. Fla. 2011), aff’d sub nom. Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., 503 F. App’x 677 (11th 
Cir. 2012). 
129. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000). 
130. See, e.g., In re Cabletron Sys., Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (asserting that 
requiring plaintiffs to name their confidential internal corporate sources would “have a chilling 
effect on employees who provide information about corporate malfeasance”); Selbst v. 
McDonald’s Corp., Nos. 04 C 2422, 04 C 3635, 04 C 3661, 2005 WL 2319936, at *6 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 21, 2005) (same); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 220 F.R.D. 30, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(noting that the Novak rule “encourage[s] whistle-blowers to expose corporate wrong-doing by 
protecting them from retaliation”). 
131. The adoption of this general approach is described in MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, 26A 
SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 24:53.10 (2013). 
Mark.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  10:44 PM 
2014] Recanting Confidential Witnesses   597 
demoralized, humiliated, demoted, or blacklisted; being denied a 
promotion, overtime, or benefits; and/or being formally disciplined, 
reassigned, or given a reduction in wages or hours.132  And it is clear 
that the incidence of retaliation against whistleblowers is high.  One 
study found that 82% of the whistle-blowing population had been fired, 
quit their job under duress, or had significantly altered responsibilities, 
as a result of their whistleblowing activities.133  Other surveys have 
found that up to two-thirds of whistleblowers lose their jobs and due to 
blacklisting, most never work in their fields of expertise again.134 
Moreover, retaliation is not limited to current employees.  Retaliation 
also is a serious issue for former employees—the category into which 
most CWs in securities litigation fall.135  In an analogous situation, the 
Fifth Circuit has noted three reasons why the informant’s privilege136 
 
132. See C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
POWER 31–32 (2001) (“The usual practice is to demoralize and humiliate the whistleblower, 
putting him or her under so much psychological stress that it becomes difficult to do a good 
job.”); Geoffrey C. Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley 
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 94 B.U. L. REV. 91, 120–21 (2007) (“Although 
the precise incidence of ostracism of whistleblowers is difficult to determine, researchers 
universally mention it as a leading consequence of blowing the whistle. . . . [S]ocial ostracism of 
whistleblowers is a more common retaliatory technique than adverse employment action.”); 
Gerard Sinzdak, Comment, An Analysis of Current Whistleblower Laws: Defending a More 
Flexible Approach to Reporting Requirements, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1633, 1668 (2008) 
(“[W]histleblowers are frequently the victims of both formal and informal retaliation.”). 
133. See Sarah Johnson, Study: Sarbox Curbs Fraud Whistleblowing, CFO.COM (Feb. 13, 
2007), http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8694488?f=related. 
134. See ALFORD, supra note 132, at 18–19 (“Somewhere between half and two-thirds of 
whistleblowers lose their jobs, . . . most never work in the field again.  In some tight-knit fields 
there is an informal blacklist.”). 
135. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Accusations of Confidential Witness Chicanery Backfire on 
Defense Lawyer, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2012, available at http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-
frankel/2012/12/05/accusations-of-confidential-witness-chicanery-backfire-on-defense-lawyer/ 
(noting that securities fraud complaints commonly rely on information from former employees). 
136. Pursuant to Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), decided by the United States 
Supreme Court more than fifty years ago, the government has a privilege to withhold from 
disclosure both an informant’s name and facts tending to reveal the informant’s identity.  Id. at 
59.  The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of the public interest in 
effective law enforcement and to make retaliation as difficult as possible.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 324 (2d Cir. 2004) (“The government’s strong and legitimate interest 
in protecting confidential sources from premature identification is undeniable.  Identification not 
only compromises the government’s ability to use such sources in other investigations, it may 
expose them to retaliation by those against whom they have cooperated.”).  The informant’s 
privilege is applicable in both criminal and civil cases.  See, e.g., Holman v. Cayce, 873 F.2d 944, 
946 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Although originally applied in the context of criminal proceedings, the 
‘informer’s privilege’ is also applicable in civil cases.”); D.M. v. Cnty. of Berks, No. 12-6762, 
2013 WL 3939565, at *6 (E.D. Pa. July 30, 2013) (same).  But see Higginbotham v. Baxter, Int’l, 
495 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 2007) (“There is no ‘informer’s privilege’ in civil litigation.”).  While 
the informer’s privilege likely applies in both civil and criminal cases, in the former it applies to 
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should be applied with respect to former employees in cases involving 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).137  First, employers almost 
always require prospective employees to supply names of prior 
employers as references when applying for a job.  Former employees 
“could be severely handicapped in their efforts to obtain new jobs if the 
defendant should brand them as ‘informers’ when references are 
sought.”138  Second, it is possible that a former employee could be 
subjected to retaliation if his new employer discovers that the employee 
previously cooperated with the government.139  Third, a former 
employee may find it desirable or necessary to seek re-employment 
with the defendant, thus exposing himself to the same risk of retaliation 
as a current employee.140  This risk of retaliation is not mere 
conjecture—most whistleblowers never work in their fields again.141  In 
light of the foregoing factors, a number of courts have agreed that the 
FLSA protects both current and former employees from retaliation.142 
It is frequently suggested that appropriate protective orders can 
protect CWs in securities cases who are fearful about safety or 
security.143  But such orders do nothing to protect against the risk of 
retaliation described above.  They also do nothing to protect against the 
pressure exerted by defense counsel who interrogate CWs during their 
depositions about possible breaches of the confidentiality clauses in 
 
statements given to federal investigators but not to statements given to private attorneys.  See 
Hubbard v. BankAtlantic Bancorp, Inc., No. 07-61542-CIV, 2009 WL 3856458, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 
Nov. 17, 2009) (“While there may be a privilege that protects persons who give statements to 
government investigators in the civil context, there is no such privacy for private civil 
litigation.”). 
137. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). 
138. Hodgson v. Charles Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 
1972); accord Dole v. Int’l Ass’n Managers, Inc., No. 90-0219PHX RCB, 1991 WL 270194, at 
*3 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1991) (discussing how an informant will likely face difficulties in gaining 
future employment in large part due to the difficulty the witness may have obtaining adequate 
references from his or her previous employer). 
139. Hodgson, 459 F.2d at 306. 
140. Id.; accord Dole, 1991 WL 270194, at *3. 
141. Rapp, supra note 132, at 118. 
142. See, e.g., Darveau v. Detecon, Inc., 515 F.3d 334, 343 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that the 
FLSA protects both current and former employees from retaliation); Phillips v. M.I. Quality 
Lawn Maint., Inc., No. 10-20698, 2010 WL 4237619, at *4-6 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2010) (rejecting 
the argument that retaliation claims must be dismissed when brought by former employees); 
Dole, 1991 WL 270194, at *3 (explaining that the threat of retaliation exists for former 
employees); Donovan v. Forbes, 614 F. Supp. 2d 124, 126 (D. Vt. 1985) (stating that present or 
former employees who have provided information to the Department of Labor under the FLSA 
are protected from disclosure). 
143. See, e.g., Loewenson & Beha, supra note 31 (“Witnesses with legitimate concerns about 
safety or security can be protected by appropriate protective orders.”). 
Mark.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/1/2014  10:44 PM 
2014] Recanting Confidential Witnesses   599 
their severance agreements.144  Under Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal 
Rules, a protective order must be premised on good cause,145 and courts 
typically find that general statements regarding a serious risk of 
retaliation do not satisfy the standard.  Rather, plaintiffs are required to 
make a specific showing that disclosure will cause a clearly defined and 
serious injury.146  Courts generally decline to find such injury, 
especially where the CW is a former employee.147 
In Boeing, the merits of plaintiffs’ argument that their CW lied at his 
deposition to remain in Boeing’s good graces are unclear.148  In other 
cases, however, it is apparent that recanting witnesses have falsely 
recanted under pressure.  In Lockheed, plaintiff argued that the recanting 
CWs had changed their stories “because of financial and other pressures 
Lockheed had brought to bear upon them once they had been identified 
by name.”149  Judge Rakoff’s careful opinion suggests that plaintiff was 
correct, at least in part.  As the opinion notes, some of the CWs “felt 
 
144. See Frankel, Confidential Witness Conundrum, supra note 33 (“[I]t’s one thing for 
[CWs] to talk to plaintiffs’ investigators.  It’s another for them to stick by their allegations when 
their former employers’ lawyers start grilling them in depositions about the confidentiality 
provisions in their severance agreements.”). 
145. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (stating that a court may, for good cause, issue a protective 
order). 
146. See, e.g., In re Marsh & McLennan Sec. Litig., No. 04 Cv. 8144(SWK), 2008 WL 
2941215, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) (stating that the threat of retaliation requires specific 
factual support); Brody v. Zix Corp., No. 3-04-CV-1931-K, 2007 WL 1544638, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 
May 25, 2007) (holding that the conclusory assertion of consequences to CWs if their identities 
were revealed “does not come close to establishing a genuine risk of retaliation”); Plumbers & 
Pipefitters Local 572 Pension Fund v. Cisco Sys., No. C01-20418JW, 2005 WL 1459555, at *7 
(N.D. Cal. June 21, 2005) (“Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence indicating that there is a 
real fear of retaliation from Cisco.”); In re Aetna Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV. A. MDL 1219, 1999 
WL 354527, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 1999) (denying protective order because plaintiffs failed to 
make specific showing that defendant “ha[d] attempted to intimidate individuals connected with 
this case or ha[d] a history of such intimidation in other cases”). 
147. See, e.g., Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund v. 
Arbitron, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (rejecting the applicability of protective 
orders to guard against the risk of retribution by CWs’ current, future, or past employers); Flaum 
& David, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that courts are reluctant to find a realistic possibility of 
retaliation if the CWs are no longer employed by the defendant). 
148. What is clear is that, as noted above, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, their CW had 
never been employed by the company, and he had never been interviewed by plaintiffs’ counsel 
before his deposition was taken.  See supra notes 125–27; see also Paul C. Gluckow & David B. 
Edwards, Recent Trends Regarding the Use of Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 45 
REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 141, 144 (2012) (“At best, a recanting confidential witness 
creates discrepancies that plaintiffs can attempt to explain away through faulty memory, the 
passage of time, or a whistleblower’s desire to stay in the good graces of the defendant.  But, at 
worst—in [Boeing], for example—a recanting confidential witness can result in dismissal and/or 
sanctions due to lack of adequate evidentiary support.”). 
149. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 
636 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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pressured into denying outright statements they had actually made.”150  
The opinion also notes that there was only one statement attributed to 
the CWs in the amended complaint that was clearly inaccurate, and that 
was the result of a drafting error by counsel that was later corrected.151 
Another example is In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Securities Litigation 
(“Dynex”).152  In Dynex the court denied in part a motion to dismiss the 
second amended complaint, relying heavily on a number of allegations 
that were purportedly derived from statements of nine CWs.  Discovery 
then took place.  Near the close of discovery lead plaintiff identified the 
nine CWs.153  Defendants moved for case-dispositive sanctions after 
five of the CWs provided declarations asserting that they did not make 
the statements attributed to them in the second amended complaint, and 
a sixth CW declared that he had no recollection of making the 
statements attributed to him.154  In response, plaintiffs’ counsel 
submitted declarations stating that they had interviewed the CWs and all 
of the paragraphs in the second amended complaint accurately reflected 
what was communicated in their interviews.  They also submitted their 
notes of their purported interviews with the CWs.155  The court denied 
the motion for case-dispositive sanctions, noting, inter alia, that the 
interview notes did not contradict the declarations submitted by 
plaintiffs’ counsel.156  Importantly, the court also accepted as plausible 
scenarios both that (1) some of the CWs recanted to remain in the good 
graces of Dynex, their former employer,157 and (2) the CWs may have 
been pressured by defense counsel to change their statements.158 
D. False Recanting Occurs in Part Because Courts Permit Discovery 
of Confidential Witnesses 
As noted above, some and perhaps much of the recanting by CWs in 
securities cases that has occurred in recent years has been a direct result 
of pressure and/or fear of retaliation by defendants.  In turn, the 
opportunity for this pressure to be exerted is a direct result of the 
unmistakable trend for courts to compel discovery of the names of 
 
150. Id. at 637. 
151. Id. at 637–38. 
152. No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB)(DF), 2011 WL 2581755 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2011), adopted by 
2011 WL 2471267 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2011). 
153. Id. at *2. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. at *4. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at *4 n.7. 
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confidential witnesses once the discovery stay has been lifted (and 
sometimes earlier).  Most federal district courts to have considered the 
issue now reject the argument that the identities of CWs are protected 
from disclosure by the attorney work product doctrine or on public 
policy grounds.159  Accordingly, once a case proceeds to discovery, 
defendants are typically able to unmask the witnesses.  This 
environment fosters an atmosphere in which defendants are able to 
pressure their current and former employees to recant.  Perhaps it is 
time for courts to reexamine the discoverability of CW identities. 
CONCLUSION 
As Judge Rakoff noted in Lockheed Martin, the widespread use of 
confidential witnesses in securities litigation is an unintended 
consequence of the PSLRA (and cases like Tellabs).160  Judge Rakoff 
concluded that problems associated with the use of CWs are likely to 
become endemic.161  One such problem is recanting by the witnesses.  
Recanting may not occur as often as some observers suggest, but it has 
occurred on a number of occasions.  And some percentage, perhaps a 
substantial percentage, of this recanting is false.  Various solutions to 
the problem of flawed CWs have been proposed, but some of these 
proposals are as flawed as the witnesses.  Permitting the depositions of 
CWs prior to the resolution of motions to dismiss is both unwise and 
contrary to the express provisions of the PSLRA.  Likewise, courts 
should decline to consider declarations by recanting CWs in the context 
of motions to dismiss.  One solution that could prove effective is for 
plaintiffs’ counsel to actively participate in the interviews of each of the 
CWs whom they intend to use as source material for allegations in their 
complaints, rather than delegating the interviews to their investigators.  
Such participation is likely to solve many of the current problems.  A 
second possible solution is for plaintiffs’ counsel to obtain from each of 
their CWs a certification that he or she has read the complaint and 
agrees with the description of the information he or she provided.  This 
proposal has some logistical problems, but if those can be overcome, it 
may prove viable.  Finally, it may be time for courts to reconsider their 
current majority view that the identities of CWs in securities cases are 
discoverable, even if the witnesses will not testify at trial.  Limiting 
 
159. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Cos., Inc. Sec., Derivative, and ERISA Litig., No. 08 MDL 
No. 1963, 2012 WL 259326, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) (citing cases finding no work product 
protection for identities of CWs). 
160. City of Pontiac Gen. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 952 F. Supp. 2d 633, 
638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
161. Id. 
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discoverability, as some courts currently do, could help solve the 
problem of false recanting. 
 
